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Abstract
The UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council should amend their rules of procedure to create
gender parity on the bench of the International Court of Justice. Only 3.7 per cent of all judges on the ICJ
have been women. The UN Charter, ICJ Statute, and long-standing practice of the Court underscore the
importance of representation, but the focus has been on geographical representation. Using the law of
international organizations, combined with the law of treaty interpretation and international human rights
law, this article argues that Article 9 of the ICJ Statute should be interpreted to include a requirement of
gender parity. Established practice, subsequent practice, and the UN’s multi-decade gender parity in staff-
ing policy establish an evolutive interpretation of what is required to fulfil equality at the UN and the ICJ.
The nomination and election procedures for ICJ judges are sufficiently flexible to facilitate this
interpretation.
Keywords: evolutive interpretation; gender; ICJ; international organizations; judges
1. Introduction: A gender-unequal bench at the ICJ
‘Each time that I gaze out at the delegations representing parties : : : I am struck that their
composition bears too much resemblance to the groups of persons who gathered in 1945 to
draft the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the Court. Very few of the counsel
are from developing countries and almost all, regardless of nationality, are men. This is an
unsatisfactory situation.’
President of the International Court of Justice, Joan E. Donoghue, 16 April 20211
As the UN’s principal judicial organ and a key mechanism for peaceful settlement of inter-state
disputes, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) remains a uniquely important player in public
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1J. E. Donoghue, ‘Reflections on the 75th Anniversary of the International Court of Justice’, UN Chronicle, 16 April 2021,
available at www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/reflections-75th-anniversary-international-court-justice.
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international law (PIL). What it is not, however, is a beacon for gender equality.2 Decades after
women have entered legal studies and the legal profession in equal or greater numbers than
men, employment in legal posts continues to skew male.3 While other international and supra-
national courts, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the African Court of
Human and People’s Rights (ACtHPR), have made strides towards or have achieved parity
on the bench, the ICJ lags behind. Since its establishment almost 80 years ago, only four of
the 108 permanent judges (3.7 per cent) have been women.4 Amongst the ad hoc judges, the
numbers are worse, with only four women out of 117 judges (3.4 per cent).5
While newer supranational courts and tribunals have had a chance to address this issue dur-
ing their creation, ICJ judicial elections for one-third of the bench occur every three years,6 cre-
ating regular opportunities for significant change. The ICJ bench is 20 per cent women
(presently three ICJ members are women),7 and would need at least four additional women
to achieve parity. With the announcement of eight candidates for five positions on 29 June
2020,8 it became clear that parity could not be achieved in the most recent election cycle, as
only three candidates were women, and two of those were already on the bench.9 On 12
November 2020, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) re-elected the four incumbent judges and Mr. Georg Nolte, maintaining the
court’s gender ratio of three women and 12 men.10 Notwithstanding calls from civil society to consider
2Gender and sex are not synonymous and there are many who do not identify as singularly a woman or a man. ‘Gender
parity’ is chosen as a frame for this article because that is the name of the UN policy that this article contends has evolved into
binding rules and the basis of evolutive interpretation. For the purposes of the bench on the ICJ, gender parity means equal
empanelment of women/men. Presently, no definitive global data on the number of non-binary persons exists, and there is
little law or state practice on this topic. Representation and full equality of non-binary people is important. It will be necessary
for parity policies to explicitly recognize the representation of non-binary persons and for law and data gaps regarding non-
binary persons to be addressed by governments and the UN moving forward. The author’s position on gender is as follows:
gender can be understood as ‘the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers
appropriate for women and men’(Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and
domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) Art. 3 – Definitions.) Gender is an analytical category regarding social and power
relations (J. Wallach Scott, ‘Gender: Still a Useful Category of Analysis?’, (2010) 57 Diogenes 1), distinct from (although fre-
quently related to) the category of biological sex (Gender Mainstreaming: Concepts and Definitions, available at www.un.org/
womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm. See also M Davies, ‘Taking the Inside Out: Sex and Gender in the Legal
Subject’, in N. Naffine and R. Owens (eds.), Sexing the Subject of Law (1997), 25, 27). Beyond the binary of women and
men or girls and boys, the concept of gender also applies to transgender people, intersex people, and multi-gendered or
gender-fluid people (D. Otto,Gender Issues and International Human Rights: An Overview (2012)). ‘Women’ is not a synonym
for ‘gender’, and a gender-sensitive approach does not mean a sole focus on women. Instead, gender analysis focuses on ‘a
hierarchical distribution of power and rights that favours men and disadvantages women and people with non-binary gender
identities’(J. Bourke Martignoni and E. Umlas, ‘Gender-Responsive Due Diligence for Business Actors: Human Rights-Based
Approaches’, (2018) Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 11). Women as used in this
article means any person that identifies as a woman, regardless of biological sex at birth.
3R. Hunter, ‘(De-)sexing the woman lawyer’, in Jones et al. (eds.), Gender, Sexualities and Law (2011); S. J. Kenney, Gender
and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter (2013); N. Grossman, ‘Achieving Sex-Representative International
Court Benches’, (2016) 110 American Journal of International Law 82.
4‘The Current Composition of International Tribunals and Monitoring Bodies’, GQUAL Campaign for gender parity in
international representation, 14 September 2015, available at www.gqualcampaign.org/1626-2/.
5Ibid.
6See Members of the Court, available at www.icj-cij.org/en/members.
7Ibid.
8Election of members of the International Court of Justice: list of nominations by national groups, Note by the Secretary-
General, UN Doc. A/75/129–S/2020/615, available at undocs.org/A/75/129.
9Supra note 4.
10General Assembly, in Second Secret Ballot Round, Elects Five Judges to Serve Nine-Year-Long Terms on International
Court of Justice, UN Doc. GA/12285, 12 November 2020; Security Council Elects 5 Judges to International Court of Justice
after Single Round of Voting, UN Doc. SC/14357, 12 November 2020.
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gender in the 2020 ICJ election,11 the UNSC andUNGA chose not to elect all three women candidates.
Similarly, the 2017 and 2018 elections were missed opportunities, where men filled all five vacant
spots, despite three of the nine nominees being women.12 The UN Charter (Charter),13 the ICJ
Statute (Statute),14 and the long-standing practice of the Court underscore the importance of repre-
sentation,15 but the focus has been on geographical representation.16
This article assesses the possibility of expanding the well-established convention of equitable
geographic distribution to include gender parity. It contends that the laws of established practice
and subsequent practice have coalesced to require an updated interpretation of the Statute of the
ICJ and the UN Charter, and that this evolutive interpretation mandates gender parity on the ICJ
bench. Just as subsequent practice can modify treaty agreements for states, established practice of
an international organization (IO) – and in this case the gender parity practice of the UN – can
modify the meaning of the terms of the IO’s constituent instruments (Article 9 of the Statute and
Article 8 of the Charter). Arguing that the obligation born of this evolutive interpretation is both
an obligation of conduct and result17 and falls on UN organs and likely UN member states, the
article suggests amending the UNSC and UNGA rules of procedure to achieve this outcome.
Parity on judicial benches matters. Women’s participation in the judiciary is key in part
because ‘[t]he judiciary influences society at all levels’.18 The ICJ impacts everything from envi-
ronmental law, to human rights, to the rule of law, and remains uniquely important regarding its
impact on general PIL as a field.19 Scholars have published excellent work regarding gender equal-
ity at supranational courts.20 Little has been written regarding gender parity on the ICJ bench,21
11‘Gender must be considered in the upcoming election of judges to the International Court of Justice’, joint statement of
The Institute for African Women in Law and GQUAL, 30 October 2020, available at www.gqualcampaign.org/gender-must-
be-considered-in-the-upcoming-election-of-judges-to-the-international-court-of-justice/.
12United NationsMeetings Coverage and Press Releases, ‘Security Council, General Assembly, Elect Four Judges to International
Court of Justice’, 9 November 2017, available at www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13063.doc.htm; United Nations Meetings Coverage
and Press Releases, ‘General Assembly, Security Council Elect Judge to International Court of Justice’, 22 June 2018, available at
www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12029.doc.htm; UN General Assembly, ‘Identical letters dated 11 November 2014 from the
Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General
Assembly and the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc. A/69/575–S/2014/808, 12 November 2014, available at www.
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_808.pdf. See UN General
Assembly, Curricula Vitae of Candidates Nominated by National Groups, UN Doc. A/69/254-S/2014/522, 4 August 2014.
13Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 8, Art. 9, Art. 23, Art. 101 (adopted 26 June 1945).
14United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice (Statute) Art. 2, Art. 3, Art. 9, Art. 31 (18 April 1946).
15B. Fassbender, ‘Commentary on Article 9’, in A Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice:
A Commentary (2012).
16W. J. Aceves, ‘Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of Equitable Distribution’, (2001) 39 Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 299; C. Tomuschat, ‘One State, one Seat, one Vote? Accommodating Sovereign Equality to International
Organizations’, in H. J. Blanke, P. C. Klein and J. Ziller (eds.), Common European Legal Thinking (2015); A. Chandrachud. ‘Diversity
and the International Criminal Court: Does Geographic Background Impact Decision Making?’, (2013) 38 Brooklyn Journal of
International Law 487; R. Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics (2010).
17Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Gabčikovo-Nagymaros), Judgment, [1997] ICJ Rep. 7, at 77, para.
135; International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft
Articles), Doc. A/56/10, Supplement no. 10, November 2001, Art. 12, paras. 11–12.
18The Fourth Action Programme for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, 1996–2000 (1996) 7.
19Case Concerning Pulp Mills On The River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Pulp Mills), ICJ Judgment, 20 April 2010,
[2010] ICJ Rep. 14; M. Fitzmaurice, ‘The International Court of Justice and International Environmental Law’, in C. J. Tams
and J. Sloan (eds.), The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (2013); Case Concerning
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic Of Guinea v. Democratic Republic Of The Congo) (Diallo), ICJ Preliminary Objections
Judgment, 24 May 2007, [2008] ICJ Rep. 1.
20E.g., Grossman, supra note 3; S. H. Vauchez, ‘More Women – But Which Women? The Rule and the Politics of Gender
Balance at the European Court of Human Rights’, (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 195, at 209.
21But see C. Rose, ‘Justifying Arguments About Selection Procedures for Judges at International Courts and Tribunals: A
Response to Nienke Grossman’, AJIL Unbound, 20 January 2017, available at www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-
journal-of-international-law/article/justifying-arguments-about-selection-procedures-for-judges-at-international-courts-
and-tribunals-a-response-to-nienke-grossman/B69BD64D47F3E43C178664E13C37D481.
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and no parity arguments have been made relying on the combination of international human
rights law (IHRL), the law of international organizations (IO law), and treaty interpretation.
2020 marked the UN’s seventy-fifth anniversary, prompting reflection regarding whether the
UN has fulfilled its promises.22 The UN Secretary General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres utilized this
anniversary to re-emphasize the UN’s gender parity policy.23 This article posits that via a combi-
nation of IO law and treaty interpretation, there are legal justifications for extending the UN’s
gender parity policy to the ICJ bench.
To build this argument, Section 2 of the article defines gender parity in the UN and ICJ context,
explains the benefits of parity on judicial benches, and suggests that the best way to achieve parity is
with a numerical, consequence backed rule. Section 3 analyses how the long-standing requirement
of gender equality has evolved into gender parity in the UN context, and unpacks how the UN’s
decades-old gender parity policy in staffing can be understood as an evolutive interpretation of gender
equality requirements in the Charter. On this basis, Section 4 builds a case that the previously examined
UN parity practice amounts to binding IO law obligating UN organs and member states. Further,
Section 4 links established practice to subsequent practice and examines the implications this has for
interpretation of the ICJ Statute, leading to Section 5, which argues that gender parity can be read into
Article 9 of the Statute via an evolutive interpretation. After these legal arguments have been made,
Section 6 puts forward a proposal for how gender parity on the ICJ bench can be achieved in accordance
with current ICJ judicial election procedures (Section 6.1), suggesting that the internal rules of both the
UNSC and UNGA permit these organs to require gender parity in candidate lists and voting (Section
6.2). Section 6.3 considers how such changes to the rules of procedure would impact member states, and
how they might be brought on board. Finally, Section 7 concludes that the UNSG, UNSC, UNGA, and
member states all likely have obligations both of conduct and result to achieve gender parity on the ICJ
bench.24 The article ends with a call to translate its legal arguments into political persuasion.
2. The benefits of a rule mandating numerical gender parity
Gender parity means ‘an equal number of women and men’.25 The UN Commission on the Status
of Women interpreted it to mean no less than 50 percent women.26 As the ICJ has 15 sitting
judges, remedying its long history of inequality might begin with an eight women/seven men dis-
tribution, to be changed to an eight men/seven women distribution and then back again at a future
time. Consideration should also be given to the representation of non-binary genders/gender-
diverse persons and a protocol drawn up to address this.
Judges significantly impact international law’s development and content.27 Projects such as
‘Feminist Judgments in International Law’ imagine how law would differ if the people writing
the judgments changed.28 Judicial identity and diversity influence trial outcomes,29 and the
22T. Deen, ‘After 75 Years, UN Claims 50:50 Gender Parity, But Falls Short of its Ultimate Goals’, IPSNews, 18 September
2010, available at www.ipsnews.net/2020/09/75-years-un-claims-5050-gender-parity-falls-short-ultimate-goals/.
23Administrative instruction, Temporary special measures for the achievement of gender parity, ST/AI/2020/5, 6 August
2020, available at www.undocs.org/ST/AI/2020/5.
24Hungary v. Slovakia (Gabčikovo-Nagymaros), supra note 17, 7, at 77, para. 135; ILC Draft Articles, supra note 17.
25P. Navarro, Women and Power: The Case for Parity (2016).
26B. Simma et al. (eds.) The Charter Of The United Nations: A Commentary (2012), at 426; D. B. Goldberg, ‘Equal
Representation of Women through the Lens of Leadership and Organizational Culture’, UN Doc. EGM/2015/Report, (8
October 2015).
27A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (2007), 266–8; D. Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of
International Criminal Law’, (2008) 21(4) LJIL 925; H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the
Permanent Court of International Justice (1982), 155.
28L. Hudson and T. Lavers, Feminist Judgments in International Law (2019).
29F. Baetens, ‘Identity and Diversity on the International Bench: Implications for the Legitimacy of International
Adjudication’, in F. Baetens, Identity and Diversity on the International Bench: Who is the Judge? (2021), at 2–4; C. L.
Boyd, ‘Representation on the Courts? The Effects of Trial Judges’ Sex and Race’, (2016) 69(4) Political Research Quarterly 789.
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different contexts, perspectives, and approaches judges bring to the bench30 impact the legal con-
tent of their decisions.31 While a gender-balanced judiciary is not a panacea for all problems,32 the
benefits of parity on benches are numerous. Positives include increased legitimacy, representation,
public confidence, access to justice, fairness, good governance, equality, rule of law, sustainable
development, and much more.33 It is no wonder, then, that the call for parity on international
benches is decades old.34
This article assesses the best options for achieving gender parity on the ICJ bench. After review-
ing practice at other supranational courts, it concludes that a consequence backed rule to achieve
numerical parity is the most certain path. The ACtHPR did not achieve parity until it imple-
mented a penalty for failing to do so.35 The Protocol to the African Charter called for ‘adequate
gender representation in [the] nomination process’36 and that ‘in the election of the judges, the
Assembly shall ensure there is adequate gender representation’.37 Yet, law alone did not result in
this outcome, and neither did repeated requests from the court’s Office of Legal Counsel asking
that states nominate women judicial candidates.38 The Office had to introduce a punitive measure
disqualifying states that did not submit at least one woman candidate for parity to be achieved.39
Requiring precise numerical parity and backing failure to achieve this with a penalty provides a
guarantee that ‘softer’ rules do not. Grossman noted that ‘[f]or [international] courts where states
were required by statute to take sex into account when nominating or voting for judges, a higher
percentage of women sat on the bench’ as compared to courts that did not have such a rule.40
These results, while improved, were far from parity, totalling 32 per cent women judges at courts
with ‘gender balance’ rules compared to 15 per cent women judges for tribunals without such
30See, e.g., J. J. Dawuni and Hon. A. Kuenyehia, International Courts and the African Woman Judge, Unveiled Narratives
(2018).
31See, e.g., D. Otto, ‘Feminist Judging in Action: Reflecting on the Feminist Judgments in International Law Project’, (2020)
28 Feminist Legal Studies 207–11.
32E.g., R. Grey, K. McLoughlin and L. Chappell, ‘Gender and judging at the International Criminal Court: Lessons from
“feminist judgment projects”’, (2021) 34(1) LJIL 248.
33Lady Hale, ‘Fiona Woolf Lecture for the Women Lawyers’ Division of the Law Society: Women in the Judiciary’, 27 June
2014, available at www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140627.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1vk_L-67LYlXPkr7icixtJxkh9Z_zLM-
8KqGByGqpvT9-LZXxK5bCm6o0; K. Malleson, ‘The case for gender quotas for appointments to the Supreme Court’,
UKSCblog, 23 May 2014, available at ukscblog.com/case-gender-quotas-appointments-supreme-court/; IDLO, ‘Women
Delivering Justice: Contributions, Barriers, Pathways’, 2018, available at www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/
IDLO%20-%20Women%20Delivering%20Justice%20-%202018.pdf; N. Grossman, ‘Sex Representation on the Bench and
the Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts’, (2011) 11 International Criminal Law Review 643; M. Minow, ‘Taking
Up the Challenge of Gender an International Criminal Justice: In Honor of Judge Patricia Wald’, (2011) 11 International
Criminal Law Review 365; R. Hunter, ‘More than Just a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-making’, (2015)
68 Current Legal Problems 119; S. Kalantry, ‘Women in Robes’, (2012) 83 Americas Quarterly 83–8; OSCE Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Gender, Diversity and Justice: Overview and Recommendations, 23 May 2019,
available at www.osce.org/odihr/gender-diversity-justice-paper.
34United Nations, Report of the FourthWorld Conference onWomen, Beijing, UN Doc. A/CONF.177/20, para. 142b (4–15
September 1994).
35African Court, ‘Current Judges’, available at www.african-court.org/en/index.php/judges/current-judges.
36Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Doc. OAU/
LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.1 rev. 2, Art. 12(2) (1997).
37Ibid., Art. 14(3).
38African Union Executive Council, Decision On The Modalities On Implementation Of Criteria For Equitable
Geographical And Gender Representation In The African Union Organs, Doc. EX.CL/953(XXVIII), 23–28 January 2016,
available at au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/29513-ex_cl_dec_898_-_918_xxviii_e.pdf; African Union, Call for
Nominations, BC/OLC/66.5/502.18, 26 March 2018, available at au.int/sites/default/files/announcements/34089-annc-502.
18_bc-olc-66.5_eng_nv_for_election_for_judges_june-july_2018.pdf; J. Jarpa Dawuni, ‘African Women Judges and Gender
Parity on the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, LSE Blogs, 13 March 2017, available at blogs.lse.ac.uk/
africaatlse/2017/03/13/african-women-judges-and-gender-parity-on-the-african-court-on-human-and-peoples-rights/.
39Dawuni, ibid.
40Grossman, supra note 3, at 82.
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rules.41 Notably, courts such as the ICC and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
which have rules promoting women’s empanelment that stop short of parity, have not achieved
it, or if they have, have not always maintained it. Article 36(8)(1)(iii) of the Rome Statute of the
ICC requires that states parties select ‘[a] fair representation of female and male judges’.42 The
absence of a precise numerical requirement43 in this ‘fair representation’ rule has meant that
at times that the percentage of women has been as high as 60 per cent and once there was even
an all-women bench.44 However, consecutively between 2015 and 2018, women’s representation
dropped to almost a third of the overall number of judges,45 reminding one that without firm
floors, ‘[t]here is no “acquis”, i.e. the advancement of women may at any time fall behind existing
achievements’.46 For the ECtHR, a 2004 resolution stating that the Parliamentary Assembly that
elects the judges would no longer ‘consider lists of candidates where : : : the list does not include at
least one candidate of each sex’47 has resulted in at most 40 per cent empanelment of women.48
The resolution was weakened via an ECtHR advisory opinion,49 and presently women’s represen-
tation is 34 per cent.50 These examples suggest that a 50/50 penalty-backed parity rule would be
beneficial for achieving and maintaining numerical gender parity on the ICJ bench. This article
argues that achieving precise numerical parity is necessary to fulfil the right to gender equality. To
support this claim, the next section builds a case that, in the UN context, gender equality has
evolved to require gender parity.
3. How gender equality has evolved to require gender parity at the UN
3.1 Gender parity as an apex interpretation of gender equality
Gender equality is a long-established legal right,51 and gender parity is a more recent interpreta-
tion of this right.52 Gender equality and the related prohibition on gender-based discrimination
41Ibid. The data on benches with gender balance rules compared the 2015 benches of the ICC, ECtHR, ACHPR, and the ad
litem benches of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda to the 2015 benches of seven courts (Andean Tribunal of Justice, Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization,
Court of Justice for the Economic Community of West African States, European Court of Justice, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, International Court of Justice, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) without such rules.
42International Criminal Court, ‘Judicial Divisions’, March 2018, available at www.icc-cpi.int/about/judicial-divisions.
43See ICC, ‘Procedure for the nomination and election of judges, the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors of the
International Criminal Court’, ICC-ASP/3/Res.6, available at asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-3-Res.
6-CONSOLIDATED-ENG.pdf, at A.2, A.6(c), A.11, A.12, B.20(b) and (c). No precise numbers are required and it is impos-
sible to predict numerical outcomes on the basis of these rules.
44ICC figures for 2017 and 2018 ICC judges, available at www.icc-cpi.int/bios-2; L. Chappell, ‘Gender and Judging at the
International Criminal Court’, (2010) 6 Politics & Gender 487; B. Inder, ‘Statement by the Women’s Initiatives for Gender
Justice: Launch of the Gender Report Card on the ICC’, 6 December 2010, available at www.iccwomen.org/documents/
GRCLaunch2010-Speech_2.pdf; Special Court For Sierra Leone Outreach And Public Affairs Office, Press Clippings, 8
March 2011, available at www.rscsl.org/Clippings/2011/2011-03/pc2011-3-8.pdf.
45Gender Report Card of the ICC, ibid.
46Simma et al., supra note 26, at 246.
47Council of Europe Resolution 1366 Parliamentary Assembly, Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights,
(2004) at S. 3(2); Vauchez, supra note 19, at 201.
48Vauchez, ibid., at 209.
49Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates Submitted with a View to the Election of
Judges to the ECtHR (Election of Judges), GC, No. 1, S.54, (Eur. Ct. H. R. 12 February 2008); Vauchez, supra note 20, at 207.
50Judges of the Court, European Court of Human Rights, available at www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court%
2Fjudges.
51Charter, supra note 13, Preamble para. 2, Art. 55, Art. 56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res. 217 A(III)
(UDHR), 10 December 1948, at Preamble para. 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 UNTS
171 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 993 UNTS 3 (1966).
52Human Rights Council (HRC), Rep. of the Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination Against Women in Law and in
Practice, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/50, (19 April 2013).
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are represented in every major human rights treaty53 and are international rules with customary
status.54 Some treaties address gender equality as a non-derogable right55 that states have a ‘man-
datory and immediate obligation’ to fulfil.56 Such obligations would apply equally to the UN and
its organs57 and prohibit member states and the UN from discrimination based on sex.58
Gender parity arises from gender equality in part because over time the prohibition on sex
discrimination under international law, a negative obligation, has evolved to require substantive
equality under international law,59 a positive obligation. In other words, an obligation of conduct
(not to discriminate) has evolved into an obligation of result (ensure gender parity). Human
rights, including those in the Charter, were designed to evolve.60
There are several legal interpretations of equality: formal, substantive, and transformative. ‘Equality
before the law’ has historically meant formal equality, but IHRL has long emphasized the need to achieve
substantive equality.61 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that securing
equality entails achieving equality in fact and eliminating indirect discrimination in law, policies,
and/or practices.62 Duty bearers, whether states or IOs, are obligated to positively fulfil these rights.63
This interpretation of equality is bolstered by transformative equality, ‘which sees full and gen-
uine equality as likely to be achieved only when the social structures of hierarchy and dominance
based on sex and gender are transformed’.64 Transformative equality is an appropriate doctrine
through which to approach parity on the bench because it focuses on including historically
excluded groups and requires structural change to achieve this inclusion.65 Gender parity on
the ICJ bench corresponds to transformative equality’s aims, such as overcoming cycles of disad-
vantage and promoting social and political inclusion and participation.66 Because transformative
53See, e.g., Charter, supra note 13, Preamble para. 2; Art 5, UDHR, supra note 51, at Preamble para. 5, Arts. 7, 21, 23(2);
ICESCR, supra note 51, Art. 3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
Art. 1.
54CEDAWCommittee, General Recommendation No. 23: Political and Public Life, UN Doc. A/52/38, para. 13 (1997); S. C.
Wang, ‘The Maturation of Gender Equality into Customary International Law’, (1994–1995) 27 New York University Journal
of International Law and Politics 899.
55ICCPR, supra note 52, Art. 4(1).
56UN Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (CESCR), para. 16.
57Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Agreement Between WHO and Egypt),
Advisory Opinion, [1980] ICJ Rep. 73.
58Charter, supra note 13, Ch. III, Art. 8; ICCPR, supra note 51, Arts. 2, 3, 4, 26; ICESCR, supra note 51, Arts. 2, 3; CEDAW, supra
note 53; 1249 UNTS vol. 1249, Art. 13 (18 December 1979); CESCR, supra note 56, General comment No. 24 (2017) on State
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, (10 August
2017); CESCR, General Comment No. 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant), UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4, (11 August 2005); UN Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC), CCPR General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, (10 November 1989);
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), General Recommendation No. 28
on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, 47th sess, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28, (16 December 2010); CEDAW Committee, Report of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Thirtieth Session; Thirty-First Session, UN GAOR, 59th
sess, Supp No 38, UN Doc. A/59/38, (2004); CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, on Article 4, Paragraph
1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on Temporary Special Measures, (2004).
59CEDAW, ibid., Art. 4(1); CEDAW Committee General Recommendation no. 25, ibid; CEDAW Committee, General
Recommendation No 28, ibid.
60T. Buergenthal, ‘The Evolving International Human Rights System’, (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 783.
61G. L. Abernethy, Introduction to the Idea of Equality: An Anthology (1959), at 15–24; M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: CCPR commentary (1993), at 466, 468.
62CESCR, General Comment No. 16, supra note 58, paras. 7, 8, 13.
63Ibid., para. 21.
64M. A. Freeman, C. Chinkin and B. Rudolf, ‘Article 1’, in M. A. Freeman et al. (eds.), The UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Commentary (2012), 55.
65J. Clifford, ‘Equality’, in D. Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (2013), 430.
66S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (2011), 25.
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equality represents cutting edge IHRL, some might counter that it is lex ferenda. However, the
latest legal developments in human rights, such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, which promotes transformative equality in almost every article, communicates that
what was once a novel understanding of equality is better understood as the standard interpreta-
tion.67 State support for this treaty – there are currently 182 states parties – underscores that trans-
formative equality is now accepted as integral to IHRL.68
That equality can result from parity requirements is supported by what IHRL calls ‘special’ or
‘specific measures,’ and domestic law calls quotas. Because formal equality means ‘the state should
not give preference to any one group and that people should be treated exclusively on their indi-
vidual merits and regardless of group membership’,69 several treaties create an exceptional basis
for such preferences in order to achieve substantive equality.70 The CEDAWCommittee’s General
Recommendation No. 25 notes that special measures should ‘accelerate the equal participation of
women in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field’.71 For decades, the
UNSG has used special measures in furthering its gender parity staffing policy.72 The UN’s inter-
nal justice system has confirmed through multiple decisions that special measures creating gender
parity in UN staffing are valid.73
Gender equality rights extend to gender on the bench.74 International law enshrines women’s
rights to participate equally in public life including public service.75 Member states and the UN
must prevent both direct and indirect discrimination as a way to ensure greater gender diversity
on the bench,76 and ‘take all appropriate measures’ to ensure gender-equal representation at the
international level,77 including at courts.78 Both the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women and the Working Group on The Issue of Discrimination against
Women in Law and in Practice have emphasized that gender equality includes equal access to and
67J. Corsi, ‘Art.5 Equality and Non-Discrimination’, in I. Bantekas et al. (eds.), The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities: A Commentary (2018), 140.
68See www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html.
69D. Moeckli, ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination’, in D. Moeckli et al. (eds.), International Human Rights Law (2013), 159.
70Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106, Arts. 5(4), 24, 25, 27 (13 December 2006);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195, Art. 1(4) (1965);
CEDAW, supra note 53, Art. 4(1).
71CEDAW Committee, supra note 54, para. 18.
72United Nations Secretariat, Special Measures for the Achievement of Gender Equality, UN Doc. ST/AI/412, para. 13 (5
January 1996); United Nations Secretariat, Special Measures for the Achievement Of Gender Equality, UNDoc. ST/AI/1999/9,
(5 January 1996); United Nations Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the Improvement of
the Status of Women in the Secretariat, UN Doc A/50/691, para. 15 (27 October 1995).
73Anderson Bieler v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgment No. 765, Case No. 837, (UN Adm. Trib. 26 July
1996);Grinblat v. The Secretary-General Of The United Nations, Judgment No. 671, Case No. 731 (UN Adm. Trib 4 November
1994);Katz v. The Secretary-General Of The United Nations, Judgment No. 1056, Case No. 1152 (UN Adm. Trib. 26 July 2002);
Appleton v. Secretary-General Of The United Nations, Judgment No. 2013-UNAT-347/Corr.1, Case No 2012-390, (UN Adm.
Trib 4 September 2013); Farrimond v. Secretary-General Of The United Nations, Judgment No. UNDT/2014/068, Case No.:
UNDT/GVA/2014/003, (UN Adm. Trib, 19 June 2014).
74CEDAW, supra note 53, Art. 4(1), CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations, the Netherlands, UN Doc. CEDAW/
C/NLD/CO/5, para. 33 (5 February 2010); CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Algeria, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/
DZA/CO/3-4, para. 26, (23 March 2012); CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations, Tajikistan, UN Doc. CEDAW/
C/TJK/CO/4-5, para. 22 (29 October 2013); CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations, Cambodia, UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/KHM/CO/4-5, para 29. (29 October 2013); CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations, Austria, UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/AUT/C)/7-8, para. 31 (22 March 2013).
75ICCPR, supra note 51, Art 25; CEDAW, supra note 54, Art 7.
76OSCE Office, supra note 33.
77C. Martin, ‘Article 8 of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Stepping Stone in
Ensuring Gender Parity in International Organs and Tribunals’, GQUAL, 14 September 2015, available at www.
gqualcampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Advocacy-Piece-1.pdf.
78S. Wittkopp, ‘Article 8, in The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, A
Commentary’, in M. A. Freeman et al. (eds.), Oxford Commentaries on International Law (2013), at 224.
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participation in the international judiciary.79 This is because substantive equality requires both
representation and participation,80 in part because courts are both political and representative.81
In addition to aspiring to impartiality, rule of law, and judicial independence, courts are also
political agencies where judges might act as political agents.82 This is at least partly true at the ICJ,
where voting patterns can map to a judge’s national origin and/or favour the state that nominated
the judge,83 and where judicial elections can be a political process,84 albeit one moderated by insti-
tutions and procedures intended to depoliticize.85 Structural bias in international law and at the
ICJ is well documented.86 The underrepresentation of women in the international judiciary con-
tributes to this and ‘legitimate[s] the unequal position of women around the world rather than
challeng[ing] it’.87 Thus, gender parity on judicial benches is both a fulfilment of representation
and participation in and of itself, and a means for securing more of it based on the decision-
making patterns of women judges.88
3.2 The UN’s interpretation of gender parity as fulfilling gender equality in the Charter
The UN’s commitment to gender parity in staffing is decades old, with early indications dating to
1970,89 and the initial target year for achieving gender parity in UN staffing set at 2000.90 The
UNSG called parity ‘fundamentally a right’91 and stated that ‘[g]ender parity is : : : a crucial first
step to orienting the system more strongly to deliver on gender equality’.92 The UN Working
Group has described parity ‘as the ultimate measure of equality’.93 In 2020 the UNSG
79CEDAW Committee, supra note 54, para 5.
80S. Fredman, ‘Substantive equality revisited’, (2015) 14 International Journal of Constitutional Law 712; P. Meier, ‘Critical
Frame Analysis of EU Gender Equality Policies: New Perspectives on the Substantive Representation of Women’, (2008) 44
Journal of Representative Democracy 155.
81Kenney, supra note 3.
82D. O’Brien, ‘Reconsidering Whence and Whither Political Jurisprudence’, (1983) 36 Western Political Quarterly 561.
83E. A. Posner and M. F. P. de Figueiredo, ‘Is the International Court of Justice Biased?’, (2005) 34 Journal of Legal Studies
601, 623–4.
84M. N. Shaw, ‘The System of Election’, in Rosenne’s Law and Practice of the International Court: 1920-2015, paras. 79–81;
Mackenzie, supra note 16, at 64–7, 78, 84, 95, 98.
85Statute, supra note 14, Arts. 2, 3, 9; L. F. Damrosch, ‘The Election of Thomas Buergenthal to the International Court of
Justice’, (2000) 94(3) AJIL 581; L. F. Damrosch, ‘Commentary’, in C. Peck and T. H. C. Lee (eds.), Increasing the Effectiveness of
the International Court of Justice (1997), 193–4.
86A. Bianchi, ‘Choice and (the Awareness of) its Consequences: The ICJ’s “Structural Bias” Strikes Again in the Marshall
Islands Case’, AJIL Unbound, 2 June 2017, at 81–7, available at www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-
international-law/article/choice-and-the-awareness-of-its-consequences-the-icjs-structural-bias-strikes-again-in-the-
marshall-islands-case/551C44750486C0701A825A8707FCD688; V. Kattan, ‘“There was an elephant in the court
room”: Reflections on the role of Judge Sir Percy Spender (1897–1985) in the South West Africa Cases (1960–1966) after
half a century’, (2018) 31 LJIL 147–70; V. Kattan, ‘Decolonizing the International Court of Justice: The Experience of
Judge Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan in the South West Africa Cases’, (2015) 5 Asian Journal of International Law 310–55.
87H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, The boundaries of international law: A feminist analysis (2000), 1.
88Women are not a monolithic group and decide diversely. Additionally, not all women are feminists or concerned with
gender equality, and like other genders they face structural constraints and bias in their decision making. However, the litera-
ture cited in this article suggests that women are more likely to decide judgments in favour of gender equality claims as com-
pared to male judges (e.g., Boyd, supra note 29, at 78).
89UN General Assembly, Programme Concerted International Action For The Advancement Of Women, UN Doc. A/RES/
2716, (15 December 1970); United Nations, Summary Of The Report On Personnel Problems In The United Nations, UN
Doc. JIU/REP/71/7, (August 1972); United Nations, Report On Women In The Professional Category And Above In The
United Nations System, UN Doc. JIU/REP/77/7, (1 August 1978); United Nations, Status of Women in the Professional
Category and Above: A Progress Report, UN Doc. JIU/REP/80/4, (March 1980).




93HRC, supra note 52.
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reemphasized the urgent need to achieve gender parity in UN staffing.94 The additional examples
presented infra in this section suggest that, in the UN context, gender equality cannot be fulfilled
without gender parity.
The UN’s gender parity commitment is articulated in numerous ways, including the Nairobi
Forward-looking Strategies of 1985,95 the Beijing Platform,96 various UNSC Resolutions calling for
women’s equal participation in decision-making,97 and UNGA Resolutions such as 33/143 calling
upon member states to ‘assist the United Nations’ in increasing the proportion of women employ-
ees ‘by nominating more women candidates’ to positions.98 Parity practice is clear in the Human
Rights Council’s Consultative Group’s guidelines on gender parity in international appoint-
ments,99 and the creation of the Working Group on the issue of Discrimination against
Women in Law and Practice.100 The UN’s parity strategy document states that parity is ‘an imper-
ative requested by Member States’,101 reflecting both state practice in favour of gender parity and
the links between customary international law and the customary law of IOs.102
Further, there is evidence that parity should apply to UN courts and tribunals and is compatible
with geographical distribution. Ebrahim-Carstens notes that the UN’s internal justice system – the
United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal (UNAT) –
has always had a significant women’s presence on the bench, and even at times a majority of
women.103 Both Tribunals’ Statutes state that the appointment of judges shall take both geograph-
ical representation and gender balance into account.104 Since 2015 both the UNSG and the
President of the UNGA instruct member states to consider ‘geographical distribution and gender
balance’ when appointing UNDT/UNAT judges.105
The UN’s internal administrative tribunals are significantly distinct from the ICJ, including
that the administrative judges are appointed by the UNGA and ICJ judges are elected. The
ICJ is of much greater political significance to states than the UNDT/UNAT. Further, gender ‘bal-
ance’ is not the same as parity and often results in less than 50 per cent empanelment of women.
Despite this, there are several takeaways from the UNDT/UNAT example relevant to parity at the
ICJ. The administrative tribunals demonstrate that there is precedent for both the UNSG and
UNGA, key players in the ICJ judicial nomination and election process, to call for a gender bal-
ance – and to interpret this as requiring numerical parity – in judicial appointments within the
UN system. Similarly, it would not be unusual for the UNSG and the UNGA to instruct member
states to take gender balance into account when nominating judges, and for member states to
comply. And, the UNDT/UNAT example demonstrates that geographical distribution can coexist
94Administrative instruction, supra note 23.
95World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality,
Development and Peace, Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies, 356, UN Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev, (26 July 1985).
96Statute, supra note 14, para. 142b.
97SC Res. 1325, (20 October 2000); SC. Res. 1889, (5 October 2009).
98GA Res. 33/143, (10 December 1978).
99Paper on file with author.
100The Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination Against Women in Law and Practice, United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner, available at www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/WGWomen/Pages/WGWomenIndex.aspx.
101Strategy, supra note 101, at 2.
102R. Higgins, ‘The Development of International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations’, (1965) 59 American
Society of International Law Proceedings 116, at 118–20.
103M. Ebrahim-Carstens, ‘Gender Representation on The Tribunals of the United Nations Internal Justice System: A
Response to Nienke Grossman’, (2016) 110 American Journal of International Law 98.
United Nations Dispute Tribunal Statute (UNDT) Art. 4(2) (adopted by GA Res. 63/253 (24 December 2008) and amended
by GA Res. 69/203 (18 December 2014) and GA Res. A/70/112 (14 December 2015); United Nations Administrative Tribunal
Statute (UNAT) Art. 3(2) (adopted by GA Res. 63/253 (24 December 2008) and amended by GA Res. 66/237 (24 December
2011), GA Res. 69/203 (18 December 2014), and GA Res. 70/112 (14 December 2015).
104Ibid.
105Memorandum of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/70/538, para. 21 (4 November 2015); UN GAOR, 70th Session 57th
plenary meeting, UN Doc. A/70/PV.57, (18 November 2015).
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with gender balance. In a nutshell, internal UN practice supports not only gender parity in staffing
but gender parity in judicial appointments.
The UN’s System-Wide Strategy on Gender Parity does not expressly mention ICJ judges. This
is important, because a staffing policy is distinct from the political elections that empanel ICJ
judges. How an internal administrative policy could create binding rules that apply to elections
is the subject of Sections 5–7. For the purposes of this section, it is interesting to consider that,
based solely on a fair reading of the plain text of the staffing policy, the position of ICJ Judges
might be classed as a senior level of leadership within the UN. This interpretation can be made
on the basis that ‘the Strategy is intended to have system-wide application’.106 The strategy stresses
the need to look at the so-called ‘top’ positions because ‘there is an inverse relationship across the
[UN] system between seniority and women’s representation—the higher the grade, the larger the
gap in gender parity’.107 It states that ICJ staffing as a whole has achieved more than 50 per cent
employment of women,108 and yet its bench lags behind.
The UN’s System-Wide Strategy on Gender Parity also sheds light on the relationship between
equitable geographic representation and gender parity. The UN’s staffing policy holds geographic
diversity and gender equality as ‘parallel goals’ that ‘should be mutually reinforcing’ and enacted
‘simultaneously’.109 Further, ‘geographic representation cannot be used as an excuse not to achieve
gender parity’.110 Section 7 examines the ICJ’s long-standing practice of equitable geographical
distribution. The UN’s parity policy’s coupling of these targets indicates their equal importance.
It also implies the ICJ’s geographical representation achievements are not enough to fulfil equality
under the Charter. A UNSG temporary special measure from 1996 allowing exceptions to geo-
graphical parity requirements in favour of gender parity in hiring demonstrates that, where there
is tension between the two objectives, at least in some cases the UN’s parity policy prioritizes
increasing women’s employment.111
Viewed holistically, the UN’s gender parity policy demonstrates its intention to evolve the
meaning of gender equality under the Charter.112 While IOs are not parties to their consti-
tuting documents, ‘it is generally accepted that constituent instruments may be a source of
international legal obligations for organisations.’113 If the Charter is interpreted pursuant
to the familiar tenets of treaty interpretation codified in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), there is a case that the Charter contains obliga-
tions to uphold gender equality and therefore parity.114 The strictest reading of the Charter
regarding parity would result in obligations for the UNSG, and consequently all organs.115
This would affect the way the UNGA/UNSC handle ICJ nominations and elections. These
impacts are the focus of Section 8.
An evolutive interpretation of Article 8 of the Charter would entail that ‘all United Nations
organs should be obliged to respect Art. 8’.116 The Charter has rarely been amended, but this





111United Nations Secretariat, Special Measures for the Achievement of Gender Equality, UN Doc. ST/AI/412, 5 January
1996, para. 13; United Nations Secretariat, Special Measures for the Achievement Of Gender Equality, UN Doc. ST/AI/1999/9,
5 January 1996; United Nations Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the Improvement of
the Status of Women in the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/50/691, 27 October 1995, para. 15.
112On intention in evolutive interpretation of treaties see E. Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (2014), 1–3;
E. Bjorge, ‘International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica
v Nicaragua) Judgment of 13 July 2009’, (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 277–9.
113G. Verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (2011), 56.
114Charter, supra note 13, at the Preamble, Arts. 1(3), 1(4), 8.
115Simma et al., supra note 26, at 232.
116Ibid., at 232; UNAT, Mullan v. The United Nations Secretary-General, 387, UN Doc. AT/DEC/114-166 (1974).
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has not stopped significant modifications,117 aided by the Charter’s ‘open texture’.118 Article 8
implicates staffing at the ICJ in particular, as equal participation should occur ‘in principal
and subsidiary organs’.119 Building on the fact that decades of UN practice demonstrate the exis-
tence of a belief in gender parity in staffing as a legal requirement, the next section analyses how
the law of established practice transforms these repeated actions into binding rules of both con-
duct and result for both UN organs and UN member states.
4. Established practice, subsequent practice, and gender parity requirements
4.1 So-called established practice
This section examines the so-called established practice, or institutional practice,120 of IOs in light
of gender parity on the ICJ bench. Established practice should be distinguished from subsequent
practice, with the former pertaining to the organization and the latter to states parties and/or
member states.121
While established practice is less frequently discussed than subsequent practice,122 it is well-
settled that established practice falls within the rules of an IO. In Personal Work, the
Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that reference to international practice
can help elucidate rules, characterizing resort to practice for ascertaining rules as ‘not unusual’.123
This early reliance on IO practice for rule ascertainment has been expanded and formalized.
Multiple treaties reference IO’s internal rules,124 indicating that established practice of the orga-
nization is envisaged as falling within the rules of the organization.125 The 2011 Draft Articles on
the Responsibility of International Organizations126 reflect an understanding of IO established
practice as a source of binding rules for the IO and potentially its member states.
Established practice is a binding, quasi-customary law of an IO, based largely on the organ-
ization’s secondary law.127 It can be understood as a third source of IO law, potentially modifying
the IO’s constituent instruments.128 The relevance of established practice as a source of binding
law is particularly important for the argument infra regarding an evolutive interpretation of
Article 9 of the Statute.
117J. Klabbers, ‘Transforming Institutions: Autonomous International Organizations in Institutional Theory’, (2017) 6
Cambridge International Law Journal 105, at 106; F. L. Kirgis, ‘The Security Council’s First Fifty Years’, (1995) 89
American Journal of International Law 506.
118O. Schachter, ‘The Charter’s Origins in Today’s Perspective, Proceedings of the 89th Annual Meeting’, (1995) American
Society of International Law 45.
119Charter, supra note 13, Art. 8.
120C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles Of The Institutional Law Of International Organizations (2005), 20–1.
121C. Peters, ‘Subsequent Practice and Established Practice of International Organizations: Two Sides of the Same Coin?’,
(2011) 3 Goettingen Journal of International Law 622, at 633.
122Y. A. Wang, ‘The Dynamism of Treaties’, (2019) 78 Maryland Law Review 828.
123Competence of The International Labour Organization To Regulate, Incidentally, The Personal Work Of The Employer,
Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series B No 13, p. 20 (Perm. Ct. Intl. Just. 23 July 1926).
124Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Art. 5, 1155 UNTS 331, (23 May 1969, entered into force on 27
January 1980); The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations, UN Doc. A/Conf. 129/15, (1986); The 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States
in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character, Doc. A/CONF.67/16, (14 March 1975);
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries,
in Report on the Work of Its Sixty-third Session, Ch. V, UN Doc. A/66/10 (26 April 26 to 3 June and 4 July to 12
August 2011) [hereinafter DARIO].
125R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2017), 281.
126DARIO, supra note 124, Art. 2(b).
127Higgins, supra note 102, at 121; Peters, supra note 121, at 630.
128Peters, supra note 121, at 641.
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Established practice likely comprises ‘the combined effect of numerous consistent acts’.129
In The Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ considered a wide range of organ practice to find
established practice.130 An IO’s established practice must not be ‘uncertain or disputed’ if
it is considered binding.131 At the same time, established practice should be viewed as evolving
rather than static.132
Section 3.2 of this article outlines the UN’s numerous, consistent parity acts and a wide range of
organ practice. These acts have continuously increased over time. As noted previously, the UN
describes its gender parity policy as fulfilling the Charter’s purpose. This is important for under-
standing established practice regarding parity as a binding IO rule: if the UN asserts its action is
taken to fulfil its Charter, this is presumed to be correct,133 particularly when the UN is acting to
fulfil the competence of its staff.134 On this basis, it is likely that, via the extensive pattern of prac-
tice coupled with prolonged acquiescence from member states, the parity in staffing policy has
coalesced into ‘Charter law’.135 The duration of the parity policy aids this conclusion: the original
target for gender parity staffing was 2000, member states supported this, and the policy has
expanded in the last 20 years. Enduring state acceptance of IO practice can create binding obli-
gations for states arising from this practice.136
Thus, there is a case to be made that the UN gender parity policy is a customary rule for the
organization based on established practice. This means the UN parity policy, even if not orig-
inally intended to do so, could bind member states and UN organs. While the Charter envis-
aged gender equality and did not discuss parity, the UN’s established practice demonstrates
that, in the context of the UN, gender equality now requires gender parity. This could impact
the ICJ bench in part because established practice’s scope is broad: ‘it has the potential to at
least add substantive rules to the law of the organization, which have not been included into
the constituent instruments.’137 Established practice is lex specialis, making internal IO rules
preeminent when interpreting the IO’s constituent instruments.138 This is important for those
who may wish to rebut such a rule, as it will create an additional challenge. Quayle notes that
the ICJ has imbued established practice with strength and staying power, requiring new insti-
tutional practice to displace an existing practice-based rule.139 IO established practice may
generate CIL,140 and may also modify how subsequent practice is understood.141 VCLT
Article 5 does not contain or define the words ‘established practice’ nor explicitly state that
such practice could displace subsequent practice or modify a treaty’s terms that pre-date the
129Peters, supra note 121, at 630.
130Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Construction of a Wall), Advisory
Opinion, 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. at 149–50.
131Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1982), vol. II (part 2), at 21, para. 25.
132Ibid.
133Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Certain Expenses), Advisory Opinion,
[1962] ICJ Rep. 151, 168.
134Effect of Award of Compensation Made by The United Administrative Tribunal Opinion (Effect of Award of
Compensation), Advisory Opinion, [1954[ ICJ Rep. 47, 57; Charter, supra note 13, Art. 101(3).
135Higgins, supra note 102, at 71.
136Ibid., at 119; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia), Advisory Opinion, [1970]
ICJ Rep. 16, 22; Construction of a Wall, supra note 130, at 149; H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International
Court of Justice 1960-1989, Part Two’, (1990) 61 British Year Book of International Law 61, at 76–7.
137Peters, supra note 121, at 631–2.
138K. Schmaltenbach, ‘Article 5’, in O. Dörr and K. Schmaltenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2018);
Amerasinghe, supra note 120, at 15.
139P. Quayle, ‘Treaties of a Particular Type: The ICJ’s Interpretive Approach to the Constituent Instruments of International
Organizations’, (2016) 29 Leiden Journal of International Law 853, at 853–77, 867.
140ILC Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties
(ILC Draft Conclusions) Conclusion 4(2), paras. 4–7 (2018).
141Ibid., at Draft Conclusion 12, paras. 3–4.
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practice. However, The Wall suggests such an application.142 The next section examines how
established practice and subsequent practice interact.
4.2 Subsequent practice through the lens of established practice
Interpreting the Charter requires considering member states’ subsequent practice and evidence of
UN established practice. Considering such evidence means that how Charter provisions are inter-
preted may evolve over time. Subsequent practice is a time-honored tool for treaty modifica-
tion.143 It is vital in the context of the Charter, which is unable to change dynamically owing
to its elaborate internal amendment requirements.144 Such practice can inform the Charter’s appli-
cation by circumventing international politics and power struggles between member states at the
voting stages in the UNGA and UNSC.145
In the Wall Opinion, the ICJ confirmed that the interpretation of a treaty could evolve over
time by the practice of the IO formed under the treaty’s provisions. In this case, the ICJ noted that
Article 12 of the Charter was initially interpreted as precluding the UNGA from considering mat-
ters while the UNSC was still dealing with them.146 However, Article 12’s meaning evolved based
on the subsequent practice of the UNGA, which repeatedly adopted recommendations for matters
while these appeared on the Council’s agenda.147 The ICJ considered that the ‘accepted practice’ of
the UNGA had ‘evolved’ and was consistent with Article 12(1),148 allowing the UNGA to refer the
Palestinian matter to the Court for its advisory opinion.149 Organ practice stood in for the practice
of states parties regarding evolutive interpretation.
A significant proportion of states parties must agree to the change for subsequent practice to
modify the meaning of a treaty provision,150 creating a higher threshold of state practice than is
needed to find established practice.151 It would be challenging for this article to quantify all UN
member state positions on the UN’s gender parity staffing policy, gender parity on judicial
benches, or gender parity on the bench of the ICJ. Less challenging is noting that member states
have endorsed or at least allowed the UN parity policy over several decades. That the UN’s gender
parity policy originated in the 1980s, and that the original target was 2000, are relevant in assessing
the strength of the rules of the organization and member state reactions. Absence of member state
opposition to ‘consistent institutional practice’ implies acquiescence to it and can substitute the
need for agreement of all parties under Article 31 VCLT.152 VCLT Article 5 makes clear that an
IO’s rules can modify and precede general rules, including Article 31(3)(b).153 This means that
established practice could change the way one weighs subsequent practice when considering
the interpretation of an IO’s constituent instruments.154
142Construction of a Wall, supra note 130, at 148–50.
143I. Buga, Modifications of Treaties by Subsequent Practice (2018), at 107.
144J. Liang, ‘Modifying the UN Charter through Subsequent Practice: Prospects for the Charter’s Revitalisation’, (2012) 81
Nordic Journal of International Law 1, at 2.
145Ibid., at 2–3.




150ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 140, Conclusion 10.
151Peters, supra note 121, at 619.
152Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, supra note at 136, at 22; J. Arato, ‘Treaty Interpretation and
Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in International Organizations’, (2013) 38 Yale Journal of International
Law 289, at 322.
153Peters, supra note 121, at 623; Schmaltenbach, supra note 138.
154International Law Commission, Third report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Georg Nolte (67th session of the ILC (2015),
A/CN.4/683, at 19–20, paras. 52-53; Peters, ibid.
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Academics have debated whether subsequent practice can modify a constituent treaty rather
than simply provide evidence that is relevant to interpreting or applying its provisions.155 ICJ
jurisprudence implies that organ practice can have law-creating effect even without a high thresh-
old of member state support/with strong member state opposition.156 Additionally, when inter-
preting subsequent practice vis-à-vis established practice, the balance changes: ‘the established
practice of the UN could have created a rule of the organization with the content that its subse-
quent practice does not strictly require the agreement of all the Member States’.157
Some argue that subsequent practice is unsuitable for changing the composition of UN organs
or the Charter’s fundamental underpinnings.158 It would be difficult to claim that gender parity
changes the Charter’s nature when the policy is ‘reflective of core values that are as old as the
Organization itself’.159 This is the case even if one asserts that the parity policy is limited to
the UNSG and thus only one UN organ, because the ICJ has confirmed that one organ’s practice
can establish agreement of parties.160 Beyond the UNSG, the jurisprudence of the UNDT/UNAT
links the parity policy to Article 8 in the Charter.161 Ultimately, the combined established and
subsequent practice impacts how gender parity can be read into the ICJ Statute. The next section
applies the UN’s established practice on gender parity to an evolutive interpretation of Article 9 of
the ICJ Statute.
5. An evolutive interpretation of Article 9 of the ICJ Statute
If a term is deemed generic in nature and particularly if operation of the treaty in question is not
time-bounded, the parties may be presumed to have intended the meaning of the relevant term to
evolve over time.162 The text of Article 9 is broad, flexible, and suggestive of the possibility for
evolutive interpretation, as does its drafting history.163 Article 9 reads:
At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected
should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole
the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the
world should be assured.
Reference to the Charter is appropriate to understand Article 9’s meaning,164 as ‘the International
Court of Justice [is] established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations’.165 The distinction between the Statute and the Charter is ‘technical’ and not
an indication of legal separation between the two.166 The emphasis on gender equality in the
155Liang, supra note 144, at 5–18.
156Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), [2014[ ICJ Rep. 226, 257; S. Raffeiner, ‘Organ
practice in the Whaling case: consensus and dissent between subsequent practice, other practice and a duty to give due regard’,
(2016) European Journal of International Law 1043, at 1050–3. See J. Arato, Subsequent Practice in the Whaling Case, and
What the ICJ Implies about Treaty Interpretation in International Organizations, EJIL:Talk!, 31 March 2014, available at www.
ejiltalk.org/subsequent-practice-in-the-whaling-case-and-what-the-icj-implies-about-treaty-interpretation-in-international-
organizations/; Certain Expenses, supra note 133, at 175–7; Arato, supra note 152, at 320, 322, 327; Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia, supra note at 136, at 22.
157Peters, supra note 121, at 624.
158Liang, supra note 144, at 19.
159Strategy, supra note 90.
160Certain Expenses, supra note 133, at 165; Higgins, supra note 102; Peters, supra note 121, at 637.
161Grinblat v. SG-UN, supra note 73.
162Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, supra note 112, para. 66.
163Fassbender, supra note 15, at 584.
164Simma et al., supra note 26, at 1144.
165Art. 1 ICJ Statute (emphasis added).
166Ibid.
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Charter is significant, expressed in both the instrument’s preamble and substantive terms. These
clauses indicate that the UN as a whole and the institutions that comprise it ought not only to
espouse certain values but also to embody them. This is reinforced by Article 8 of the Charter: ‘The
United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in
any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.’167 As Section
4 articulates, established practice of the UN indicates that gender parity is necessary to fulfil
Article 8 of the Charter and that this is an obligation of both conduct and result. Thus,
Article 9 is subject to the ‘Charter law’ developed by UN gender parity policies and must be inter-
preted in accordance with it.
Article 9 of the Statute must be read ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose’.168 The key phrase is ‘the representation of the main forms of civilization : : : of the
world’. Regarding gender parity, one should question what was intended by the words ‘repre-
sentation’ and ‘main forms of civilisation’, and –more importantly – their meaning today. The
Oxford English Dictionary states that representation refers to ‘[t]he fact or process of standing
for, or in the place of, a person, group, institution, etc., esp. with the right or authority to speak
or act on behalf of these’. This is the same meaning often given in political science and political
sociology.169 The question is, who may legitimately provide such representation? Arguably,
this is someone who should be capable of ‘standing in the place of’ the people comprised from
the ‘main forms of civilisation’.
The term ‘civilization’ is fraught, as is its colonial history in international law.170 Tzouvala
rightly observes that ‘civilization’ is not ‘a unitary legal concept lending itself to conclusive
definition but : : : a mode of international legal argumentation’.171 Yet, while many things
are open to debate, this demographic fact is not. Rather, given women’s historical exclusion
from international law, focusing on women’s global prevalence as a basis for representation on
the ICJ bench is aligned with transformative equality’s call to reconfigure institutions in order
to re-centre the marginalized. A fair reading is that Article 9 cannot be fulfilled without gender
parity, because there cannot be a representation of the main forms of civilization if 50 per cent
of the members of each civilization are absent from the bench. Thus, the existence of a sub-
stantial gender imbalance on the ICJ’s bench suggests that the pure requirement of represen-
tation is not being met.172
This article proposes expanding the well-established convention of geographical distribution
used to ensure diverse representation on the ICJ bench to include gender parity.173 The
Charter’s text is suggestive that both gender equality and geographical representation should
be considered together,174 and the UN’s parity policy promotes this interpretation. Originally,
the reference to the ‘main forms of civilization’ was a means of allaying Great Power fears of their
possible future exclusion from the bench.175 The wording was left sufficiently open to permit
smaller states to envisage their equal involvement, while the Great Powers saw Article 9 as an
exception to the principle of state equality.
167See Grossman, supra note 3, at 87.
168VCLT, supra note 124, Art. 31(1).
169H. F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (1967).
170J. Sloan, ‘Civilized Nations’, Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law (2011), A.1-3.
171N. Tzouvala, Capitalism as Civilisation: A History of International Law (2020), 1.
172Fassbender, supra note 15, at 593.
173The author first heard this idea from Prof. Laurel Fletcher; conference paper by Laurel Fletcher, October 2017, presented
at the GQUAL Conference in The Hague (on file with author).
174Charter, supra note 13, Preamble, para. 2.
175Ibid., at 582; Spiermann, ‘Historical Introduction’, in. A. Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The Statute of the International Court
of Justice: A Commentary (2012), at 53.
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Today, equitable geographical representation is tied to the UN’s system of regional groups.176
The regional groups are another example of an extra-textual system that has been grafted onto
vague Charter provisions. The history of regional groups, and how they evolved from an informal
system to a formalized, powerful organizing principle that affects the composition of all of the
most important UN offices, is relevant to gender parity on the ICJ bench. It evidences institutional
flexibility at the UN, informed at least in part by legal norms, and in part by balance of power
considerations. Article 9’s wording is similarly vague, contrasting with the Rome Statute’s Article
36(8)(a)(ii), which expressly requires ‘equitable geographical representation’ for ICC judges.177
The convention of equitable geographical representation at the ICJ and the UN demonstrates
established practice of reading in extra-textual representation requirements, providing a legal pre-
cedent for adding gender parity to the notion of representation in ICJ judicial nominations and
elections.
Analysing the practice of equitable geographical distribution within the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), Kenney examined how geographical parity in practice underscores why states his-
torically have insisted on such representation. She asks,
If one need not “stand for” in order to “act for” in Pitkin’s definition—that is, if men can
represent women and Italians can decide cases for Germans—why are Member States so
determined to have their own representatives on the ECJ?178
In Pitkin’s framework,179 in representation through gender parity women judges will be ‘standing
for’ women rather than ‘acting for’ women, the latter referring to how elected legislators might ‘act
for’ their constituents by directly representing their interest. Kenney concludes that states feel that
equitable geographical representation is necessary for protecting their interests, and that this
representation ensures compliance with the court’s decisions by imbuing them with legitimacy.180
This logic can be extended to gender parity on the bench. Even setting aside the substantive
decision-making of women versus men judges discussed in Sections 2–3, women have no less
a claim than member states of various IOs to equal representation on the basis of protecting their
interests and ensuring the legitimacy of judicial decisions. Given this, the next section outlines a
proposal for how to secure gender parity on the ICJ bench.
6. A proposal for achieving gender parity on the ICJ Bench
There are multiple ways that gender parity on the ICJ bench could be achieved. This article pro-
poses practical pathways to secure this outcome. The subsequent sections consider how existing
nomination and election procedures at the ICJ could incorporate gender parity; suggests changing
the UNGA and UNSC rules of procedure; and addresses how member states might be brought on
board with the proposal.
6.1 Incorporating gender parity into the ICJ’s existing nomination and election procedures
The nomination and election procedures for ICJ judges are general and flexible. As with geograph-
ical parity, the Statute’s broad stipulations allow for adopted conventions. This is a good thing for
gender parity: the process for modifying the Statute is arduous, requiring an amendment to be
approved by a two-thirds majority of the UNGA and ratified by two-thirds of the members of
176Where can I get information about Regional Groups?, UN Library, 26 April 2018, available at ask.un.org/faq/14521; I.
Winkelmann, ‘Regional Groups In The UN’, in H. Volger (ed.), A Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations (2009), at 592–3.
177Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 36(8)(a)(iii) (1998).
178Kenney, supra note 3, at 131–2.
179Pitkin, supra note 169.
180Ibid.
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the UN, including all five permanent members of the UNSC.181 To date, the ICJ Statute has never
been amended.182 Therefore, an alternative model might be sought.
National groups at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) are key players in the nomination
process.183 Articles 4 and 5 of the ICJ Statute state that the UNSG initiates nominations by requesting
national groups to nominate between two and four candidates to the ICJ bench. At this stage, the
UNSG could encourage gender-equal submissions in the same language as is done for the internal
UN justice system. The Statute provides that in preparing their shortlists a state should ‘consult its
highest court of justice, its legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national
sections of international academies devoted to the study of law’.184 The Statute offers no guidelines or
best practices and is silent on procedure at the municipal level, although academic writing sheds light
into some national group consultations.185 This absence of a formally codified procedure may facilitate
new rules enshrining gender parity. It is worth noting that the research of Mackenzie et al.186 and in
person conversations between national group members and this article’s author suggest that in some
cases, candidates are picked by governments.187 Still, national groups remain an important focal point
for securing gender parity on the ICJ bench.
After national groups nominate candidates, the UNGA and the UNSC vote separately on the
candidates.188 Candidates receiving an absolute majority of votes from both organs are elected.189
Under Article 9, electors should keep representation in mind as they vote. Article 9 thus presents
an opening for creating a gender-parity rule that could guide and constrain UNGA and UNSC
voting. Such a rule might be achieved through a UNGA resolution, similar to the ECtHR rule
established by the Parliamentary Assembly. Civil society organizations have lobbied for this
option.190 However, UNGA resolutions are non-binding on states, and UNSC resolutions are only
binding on states via Chapter VII, which is not relevant to gender parity on the ICJ bench. An
alternative is that each organ could modify its internal rules to require both gender parity in can-
didate lists and gender parity in voting. The next subsection discusses why the UNSG/UNGA
might be obligated to do so and how this can be done.
6.2 Changing UNGA and UNSC rules of procedure to create gender parity on the ICJ bench
Because the UNGA and UNSC cast the final votes for ICJ judges, modifying the voting obligations
of the UNGA and UNSC can create judicial gender parity. Amending the UNGA and UNSC rules
of procedure is one avenue through which this could be achieved. Both the UNGA and UNSC
have the power to make such changes, and there is precedent for them to do so.
Article 21 of the Charter gives the UNGA authority to adopt its own rules of procedure and the
UNGA has amended these numerous times throughout the years.191 Article 30 of the Charter
empowers the UNSC to adopt its own rules of procedure, which it has done. The UNSC may
181ICJ Statute, supra note 14, Art. 69; Charter, supra note 11, Art. 108.
182International Court of Justice, Basic Documents, Statute of the Court, available at www.icj-cij.org/en/basic-documents.
183ICJ Statute, supra note 14, Arts. 4(1), 4(2).
184ICJ Statute, Art. 6.
185K. J. Keith, ‘International Court of Justice: Reflections on the Electoral Process’, (2010) 9(1) Chinese Journal of
International Law 51; K. Keith, ‘Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’, in T. McCormack and C. Saunders
(eds.), Sir Ninian Stephen: A Tribute (2007); Damrosch (1997), supra note 85.
186Mackenzie, supra note 16, at 64–5.
187Ibid., at 78, 101. Cf. J. R. Crook, ‘Judge Buergenthal Resigns; U.S. National Group Nominates Joan Donoghue for Election
to International Court of Justice’, (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 489.
188Ibid., Arts. 8, 4.
189Ibid., Art. 10.
1902018 paper on file with author.
191United Nations, Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, XI-XVIII, UN Doc. A/520/Rev 15, (1985); United Nations,
Amendments to the Annex of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, UN Doc. a/520/Rev15/Amend.1 and 2, (21
August 1991); GA Res. 48/264 Annex II, (29 July 1994); Higgins et al., infra note 201.
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have even more flexibility regarding amending its rules of procedure given that it has chosen to
keep these rules ‘provisional’.192 Unlike the UNGA’s procedural rule 163, there is no written rule
regarding how to amend the UNSC rules of procedure, although in practice adoption of such rules
are made via affirmative vote of at least nine UNSC members, per Article 27 of the Charter.193 The
text of Article 30 across multiple languages affords significant flexibility to the UNSC in how it
decides its own rules of procedure,194 and it may do so on an ad hoc basis; ‘in the case of formally
established rules of procedure it would require the formal adoption of amendments to the existing
wording’.195 Thus, UNSC amendments regarding gender parity on the ICJ bench could be sub-
mitted and voted on per the normal rules. Such changes to the UNGA/UNSC rules of procedure
would be legally binding upon each organ,196 offering a strong foundation for both securing and
maintaining parity.
Additional aspects of the Charter are suggestive that such amendments regarding ICJ elections
would be both permissible and required. Article 103 of the Charter provides that the Charter shall
take precedent over any internal procedural regulations, giving it primacy over both the UNGA
and the UNSC’s rules of procedures. Given that the UNSG has interpreted the Charter to require
gender parity in all UN staffing, and that both organs have endorsed this view, modification of
their rules of procedure to achieve gender parity on the ICJ bench is indeed appropriate.
Thus, both the UNGA and UNSC could modify their internal rules of procedure regarding the
election of ICJ judges and create a candidacy system similar to that of the ICC’s in which candidate
lists that fail to contain sufficient numbers of women will lead to a request for a new list and
another round of voting,197 and with disqualification penalties for non-conforming lists like at
the ACtHPR. The creation of the regional groups via a series of UNGA resolutions between
1957 and 1978 demonstrates the power of the UNGA to modify voting procedures at the UN
for the purposes of equitable representation.198 The Statute is flexible enough to allow the
UNGA and UNSC to create rules that both reject candidate lists that do not meet gender parity
thresholds and require gender parity thresholds to be met when casting election votes. For exam-
ple, if seats remain unfilled after the first meeting held for election, the Statute contemplates that
second and third meetings may take place, and if necessary, the UNGA and UNSC may form a
joint conference for choosing names for remaining vacant seats.199 This inherent flexibility ren-
ders it more likely that a gender parity rule would be compatible with the Statute.
6.3 Gaining member state support for gender parity on the ICJ bench
It is possible that, as was initially the case at the ECtHR,200 member states might oppose gender
parity requirements and the idea of updating the UNGA/UNSC rules of procedure. Amending the
rules of procedure would require member state support, as the UNGA/UNSC are comprised of
member state representatives. This is compounded by the fact that UN member states are inclined
to work via consensus in both the UNGA and UNSC,201 creating a higher bar to achieve parity.
However, arguably there are legal grounds for requiring member states to support gender parity
on the ICJ bench. Additionally, trends towards gender parity rules domestically and
192A. Aust, ‘The Procedure and Practice of the Security Council Today’, in R. J. Dupuy (ed.), The Development of the Role of
the Security Council Workshop (1992), 365.




197Judicial Divisions, supra note 42.
198GA Res 1192 (1957), and Annex; GA Res 1900 (1963), and Annex; GA Res. 33/138 (1978), Annex.
199ICJ statute, supra note 14, Arts. 11–12.
200Vauchez, supra note 20, at 203–4.
201See R. Higgins et al., Oppenheim’s International Law: United Nations (2017), 36, 43 (re: UNGA), 85 (re: UNSC).
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supranationally indicate growing state practice in favour of parity on judicial benches. Further,
lobbying at the municipal, regional, and international levels can create momentum that fosters
member state support for gender parity on the ICJ bench.
Member states are bound by the fundamental human right of gender equality and are specifi-
cally instructed to create gender-equal access to the international plane.202 Numerous states have
employed these notions of substantive gender equality and gender parity to their domestic govern-
ments203 and via their roles in drafting gender balance rules at supranational courts, indicating
their acceptance of this formulation of gender equality. While some states initially rejected these
obligations on the international plane,204 in recent years more have championed gender parity in
international representation.205 Since states must nominate individuals to the selection process for
the ICJ, logically, obligations stipulated in human rights treaties to ensure equal representation
apply to states in this context. States’ human rights duties necessitate ending discrimination
through initiating and implementing affirmative measures for equal representation in interna-
tional courts.206 There is evidence that IHRL applies to aspects of the appointment process that
are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state.207 When member states vote for appointments to
international bodies, they cannot vote in a manner that contradicts or violates their international
treaty obligations.208
Additionally, IO law such as the UN’s parity staffing policy may transfer UN obligations to
member states. Organ practice can both create rules that bind member states and be indicative
of state practice in favour of such rules.209 Under the theory of transfer of powers, member states
have imbued the UN with the power to bind them.210 Member states remain partially or fully
202HRC, supra note 52.
203E.g., Loi N° Instituant La Parite Entre Les Hommes Et Les Femmes En Republique Centrafricaine, available as a down-
load at www.recef.org/wp-content/plugins/cpt-bibliotheque/telecharger.php?id=2910; Ley Que Modifica La Ley Organica
De Elecciones Respecto Al Systema Electoral Nacional, available at busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/ley-que-
modifica-la-ley-organica-de-elecciones-respecto-al-s-ley-n-30996-1801519-2/; Wahlgesetz für den Landtag Brandenburg
(Brandenburgisches Landeswahlgesetz - BbgLWahlG) 25 Aufstellung der Bewerber, available at bravors.brandenburg.de/
gesetze/bbglwahlg#25; Art. 19, 115, Constitution of Morocco 2011; Art. 174(2) Constitution of South Africa; Art. 76 of
the Constitution of Ecuador. See Preamble and Art. 3, Atribuciones Del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional Decreto 222/2003,
Procedimiento para el ejercicio de la facultad que el inciso 4 del artículo 99 de la Constitución de la Nación Argentina le
confiere al Presidente de la Nación para el nombramiento de los magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Nación. Marco normativo para la preselección de candidatos para la cobertura de vacantes. Bs. As., 19/6/2003, available
at servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/85000-89999/86247/norma.htm?fbclid=IwAR2gHde44W_AIwEy6aWNw2
Zw7gpg6HFKeiqQCqNh6ZM_ye6t9UUGVK_AGXI; M. Tarricone, ‘Las mujeres en la Justicia: son más pero ocupan cargos
de menor jerarquía’, Chequeado, 8 March 2019, available at chequeado.com/el-explicador/las-mujeres-en-la-justicia-son-mas-
pero-ocupan-cargos-de-menor-jerarquia/?fbclid=IwAR2wxGvn_s35M24CDlD1C4Bi_vBAfmiGARZFGi1najQLb5RcC
2Ys49GcbZU.
204Kenney, supra note 3, at 108–33.
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responsible for an IO’s breach of international law and therefore obligated to remedy this
breach.211 Consequently, if the UNGA and UNSC, given the roles they play in electing ICJ judges,
were in breach of their gender equality obligations, states would be responsible for this and there-
fore required to remedy it. Further, if a state supports the organization’s breach through its actions
– for example by failing to nominate women or enshrine the obligation to do so in policies or rules
– this support independently gives rise to state responsibility and therefore the need for remedy.212
There is also the argument that states must prevent such breaches by IOs in order to uphold the
integrity of international law as a system.213
There are several reasons why the UNGA and UNSC may be obligated to ensure gender parity
on the ICJ bench and that therefore member states would need to act to ensure this. ‘IO organs are
themselves subject to international human rights law’,214 and thus the obligation falls on the
UNGA and UNSC. Moreover, the UNGA has explicitly confirmed its commitment to the
UNSG’s gender parity policy on numerous occasions.215 One could argue that the UNSC has
shown its commitment to gender representation in decision making through nine different res-
olutions on women, peace, and security.216 A key point is that each organ’s established practice
indicates its understanding of the Charter,217 and that UNSC/UNGA practice supports gender
parity as a Charter requirement. As explained in Section 5, these policies have coalesced into estab-
lished practice and therefore binding rules for the organization as a whole.
As these organs have not yet taken action to create gender parity on the ICJ bench, if one
accepts their obligation to do so, they are in breach and must supply a remedy.218
Responsibility for a breach presupposes such things as legal personality, that those deemed
responsible had some say in the matter, and that they can meaningfully regulate their behav-
iour.219 The UNGA and UNSC have a say in the matter and can regulate their behaviour because
they cast the final votes for ICJ judges and can amend their internal rules that govern this voting;
they have a direct impact on the ICJ’s bench and modifying their voting obligations can create
gender parity on it. Reparation for Injuries has made clear that IOs are required to provide reme-
dies when in breach of an obligation.220 While not expressly listed amongst possible remedies,221 a
direct method for rectifying the breach could be achieved via modifications by the UNGA and
UNSC to their internal procedural rules. New rules requiring that candidate lists present gender
parity, and that voting must take gender parity into account, can rectify the imbalance on the
ICJ bench.
Even setting aside the notion that member states have gender parity obligations regarding
nominations to the ICJ, the UNGA and UNSC have the power to create a new requirement to
this effect. Member states might protest that such a change in the nomination and voting pro-
cedures creates new international law by transferring UN parity requirements to states, but organ
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place at least determine its own jurisdiction’.223 If the UNGA/UNSC were to modify their internal
rules to create gender parity on the ICJ bench, they would be assumed in the first instance to have
the competency to do this. State endorsement of the UNGA’s role in the UNDT/UNAT judicial
elections per Section 3 shows state practice that could favour this conclusion.
States might object that this interferes with their domestic affairs. However, while states have
since the advent of the UNGA’s first session asserted that Article 2(7) of the Charter prevents the
UNGA from intervening in the domestic jurisdiction of a state including regarding human rights
issues, the UNGA has repeatedly rejected this argument and declined to address so-called domes-
tic matters on this basis except extremely exceptionally.224 Rather, expansion of UNGA powers is
common and settled law and the UNGA and UNSC have confirmed their key role in protecting
and fulfilling human rights.225 It is not unusual for the UNGA’s rules of procedure to impact
member states beyond the UNGA itself, for example regarding accreditation, admissions of
new members, and elections.226 In general, IOs and their organs have ‘considerable autonomy’
regarding their internal rules,227 and this is so even when changes influence member states
and even when they object.228 When it comes to interpreting the constituent documents, and
in this case, interpreting if the Charter requires gender parity on the ICJ bench, ‘the balance
of power shifts away from Member states to organs’.229 This further empowers them to modify
their internal rules even if member states were opposed.
Member states might argue that it would be impossible for them to comply with gender parity
candidate requirements because they were incapable of locating and nominating sufficient numbers
of qualified women. States could not be held responsible for an unworkable task.230 However, this so-
called ‘pipeline’ or ‘pool’ argument has been robustly debunked.231 Further, state practice belies such
reasoning: if member states can repeatedly make judicial nominations for the ICC, the ACtHPR, and
UNAT/UNDT that satisfy gender parity, correspondingly they can for the ICJ. Against the specter that
there are simply not enough women candidates for the job, it is important to bear in mind that cur-
rently only four additional qualified women need appointing to create gender parity.
Furthermore, while not always accessible for every region, data on women in the legal profes-
sion suggests that women comprise a sizeable proportion of high-level legal posts from which to
draw ICJ judicial candidates. Women in OECD countries constitute more than 54 per cent of the
judiciary,232 and more than 30 per cent of all Supreme Court judges in Latin America are
women.233 Hennette Vauchez’s analysis of the CVs of women candidates put forth by states
for appointment to the ECtHR reveals both qualified women and the possibility that states over-
look additional capable women candidates in their selection process.234 Beyond numbers,
Grossman has pointed out that the data on the ‘pool’ does not tell the whole story.235 The political
and opaque nature of ICJ judicial nominations, which often do not involve a candidate list or pool,
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but rather one well-connected individual,236 is much more at fault. Thus, claims that the organs
cannot affect the candidate list because it impinges on member state rights or creates an impos-
sible task would likely fail on multiple grounds, paving the way for procedural change if the
UNSC/UNGA – and the member states that comprise them – chose this route.
Despite these legal arguments, member states or other actors at the UNmight oppose the suggested
changes; identifying legal obligations does not guarantee compliance with them. It will be important to
couple the doctrinal reasons articulated in this article with persuasion.237 Howmuch and what must be
done to persuade states is an open question, as is where in the ‘life-cycle’ of a norm – norm emergence,
norm cascade, or norm internalization238 – gender parity on the ICJ bench sits. To secure parity on the
ICJ bench, a critical mass of supportive states is needed.239 Lobbying efforts, such as those conducted
by GQUAL, the campaign for gender parity in international representation,240 might play a part in
encouraging key national governments to support gender parity on the ICJ. Research suggests that the
support of less than one third of states is needed to create such change; the support of ‘critical’ states
and the ‘socialization’ of other states can turn a minority position into consensus.241 Gender parity in
international appointments remains salient and urgent. It is highly unlikely that the call for gender
parity on international benches will disappear, increasing the possibility that member states will sup-
port parity on the ICJ bench.
7. Conclusion: Compelling legal reasons to create gender parity on the ICJ bench
There are compelling reasons to consider gender parity on the ICJ bench and multiple legal, not
just policy or moral, arguments in favour of parity. This article has posited that, over time, the
customary law of the UN has evolved to support gender parity on the ICJ bench. This in turn
affects the interpretation of Article 9 of the Statute regarding judicial selection, so that UN organs
such as the UNGA and the UNSC are either legally permitted or legally obligated to ensure gender
parity on the ICJ bench. Not only are there grounds for the UNGA and the UNSG to take parity
measures ‘establishing real accountability, backed by consequences’242 such as those seen at the
ACtHPR, the UNGA and UNSC can achieve this by modifying their internal rules of procedure.
There is ample precedent for them to mandate such obligations via their procedural rules, even
bearing in mind that this would impact member states. Such an outcome is supported by con-
ventions on equitable geographical distribution. Gender should be given equal weight as geogra-
phy: there is evidence that the two goals can be achieved symbiotically, and that it is at times
appropriate to favour gender parity over geographical distribution. Importantly, only through
clear and enforceable measures has parity thus far been achieved and protected. For these reasons,
the UNGA and UNSC should act now to modify their rules and create a gender equal ICJ bench.
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